Zawahiri’s Death and the Future of Al-Qaeda’s Leadership
Author: Iftikhar Firdous — Journalist and expert on South and Central Asia, and the founder of the Khorasan Diary
The U.S. strike that targeted Al-Qaeda (AQ) leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in the Shirpur area in Kabul on July 31 put an end to a twenty-year-old hunt. According to the White House, some Taliban leaders were aware of his presence in the city, specifically Sirajuddin Haqqani, as Zawahiri who had a $25 million bounty on his head, was allegedly living in one of his guest houses. Immediately after the strike, on August 2, the spokesman of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s (IEA) — the official name for Afghanistan according to the Taliban — Zabihullah Mujahid issued a message condemning the strike and warning that repeating such acts will damage relations between the U.S. and IEA and also called the strike as going against international principles. After President Joe Biden’s speech to the nation revealing the killing of Zawahiri on August 1, again Zabihullah Mujahid issued a new statement on August 4 arguing that IEA had no information that al-Zawahiri was in the country and that regardless, the U.S. strike in Kabul was a violation of the Doha agreement and if such actions are repeated, the U.S. will bear the consequences.
The first consequence of the strike is, of course, on AQ itself. The line of succession is generally depicted with the Egyptian veteran Sayf al-Adel as the first candidate. Sayf al-Adel is a military strategist of the old guard who is reportedly under house arrest in Iran; and while his choice would bring continuity between Zawahiri and the new leadership, for AQ, his presence in Iran would be an issue, notwithstanding the fact that in the past Usama Bin Laden cast some doubts on his suitability for general leadership. Second in line is Abdur Rahman al-Maghrebi, Zawahiri’s son-in-law and former head of AQ media team As-Sahab, also believed to be in Iran as well as Abdul Aziz al-Masri.
Other candidates could be Khalid Batarfi, head of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP — the most internationalised branch of AQ, Abu Ubaydah al-Anabi — head of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM or Ahmad Diriye, the leader of Somalia’s AQ affiliate, al-Shabaab. Heads of AQ affiliates in lands as far as the Horn of Africa or the Maghreb, however, would indicate an inherent weakness within Al-Qaeda core in Afghanistan-Pakistan, and the core organisation’s inability to provide new cadres. There is also the possibility that with the selection of the new leader, AQ could possibly confirm the death of Usama Bin Laden’s son and heir, Hamza Bin Laden, reportedly killed in Afghanistan in 2019 by the U.S. but never eulogised by the organisation.
Overall, the selection of the new leader will determine whether AQ will shift its focus to new regions – perhaps where the strongest local affiliates are located, such as Somalia and the Maghreb; or try to continue its recovery efforts in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region; or again, though unlikely, make attempts at reinvigorating its presence in regions where its influence has waned, such as in Syria, where its local Idlib-based affiliate — Hurras ad-din remains locked in a struggle with other Salafi-Jihadist militants for control over a portion of the province. The future trajectory of AQ will depend on which approach the new leader will adopt and on his personal character. Selecting a member from the old guard will likely continue AQ’s overall “silent” strategy of maintaining a low profile, which Zawahiri enacted after Daesh emerged and became far more global and formidable than AQ. At the same time, a new young leader might pressure AQ to engage in more complex operations in the future.
A second repercussion will be on the global jihadist movement. This year, both the leaders of Daesh (Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi) and AQ were killed, leaving the two main competitor jihadist organisations weakened. This could potentially lead to defections from one group to another, especially where the two organisations are actively competing, such as in sub-Saharan Africa, where groups like AQ-linked Ansaru and ISWAP are attracting new recruits in Nigeria. Alternatively, if AQ will indeed be further weakened by the death of Zawahiri, Daesh might take advantage of it becoming the only potent global jihadist organisation, despite its own territorial defeats in the Levant. Daesh supporters are already calling on AQ members to defect and join them.
Finally, a particular scenario that will eventually develop from Zawahiri’s death in Afghanistan is related to the Taliban and their local jihadist enemy, Daesh’s Afghanistan affiliate — known as Daesh-Khorasan Province (Daesh-KP). Daesh-KP will likely benefit from the death of Zawahiri as it will exploit its narrative that the Taliban and the U.S. are allies, accusing the Taliban of “selling” Zawahiri. This implies that local militants might be attracted to the Daesh-KP narrative and possibly join the organisation, reinvigorating its ranks. Moreover, it should be noted that Daesh-KP runs a regional network that is not limited to Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also Kashmir, India, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with the capabilities of operating a huge propaganda network that spreads its message outside its areas of attacks. This will ultimately lead to a destabilisation of the Af-Pak and, possibly, to more jihadists joining Daesh-KP, spreading instability in the region. And since Daesh-core, whatever is remaining of it, capitalises on the success of its branches – as recently happened in Mozambique –, this could lead to a new phase for Daesh on the global level as well.
