Where is Al Qaeda?
Author(s): Mohamed Hineidi — Director at EMAN
A broad scan of Al Qaeda’s (AQ) global footprint tells us that the group’s core activities today have become centred on holding and consolidating territory in various conflict zones around the world – a marked contrast to its international “jihadist” strategy that the organisation focused on in the early 2000s. Today, AQ’s various branches around the world are all currently engaged against other non-state actors and local governments in their respective geographies, indicating the group’s overarching aspirations for governance and territorial control, rather than waging terror attacks abroad. This can be seen in Syria and Somalia, where Al-Qaeda-linked groups are focused primarily on controlling territory, finances and fighting government forces. Even in those countries where AQ currently maintains a presence, it is weakened and is but a shadow of what it once was in the last two decades.
AQ today is largely defined by its regional affiliates, including Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent and other regional outfits including Al Shabab in Somalia, and loosely connected groups in Syria such as Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham and Hurras Al-Din in Syria. These affiliates, however, have suffered a series of setbacks in recent years, with the killing of key leaders in Yemen and in Mali by American and French forces respectively. The organisation’s core leadership has also been severely degraded following the killing of its second in command – Abu Mohammad Al Masri – in Tehran in August 2020.
In terms of the number of terror attacks, Daesh has now replaced AQ – with the former often claiming responsibility for virtually all lone-wolf Islamist terrorist attacks carried out in the West. Previously, AQ’s attacks were more organised, and were usually dubbed “sensational” attacks in terms of casualties and damage. In the 2010s, however, most AQ attacks were carried out in local conflict zones, particularly in the West Asia North Africa region (WANA), resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians – mostly Muslims. Attacks in the Western world during the past decade were limited, with the only attack of note being the 2015 Charlie Hebdo operation claimed by AQAP. Daesh, however, saw an opportunity and called for its supporters and followers to launch attacks against targets in the WANA region and abroad. Those mass casualty attacks include the June 2014 Camp Speicher massacre in Iraq that saw the deaths of approximately 1,700 military cadets. This operation, surpassed only by the September 11 attacks is considered the second deadliest terrorist attack in history. Other attacks include the October 2015 shooting down of a Russian civilian airline en route from the Egyptian holiday town of Sharm El-Sheikh to St Petersburg, resulting in the deaths of all 224 passengers abroad, the November 2015 Paris attacks that saw the deaths of 131 people, the 2016 Ataturk Airport attacks, the 2016 Nice ramming attacks, and hundreds of other attacks across 32 countries since 2014 that have resulted in the deaths of approximately 3,500 people.
It would be wrong to assume that just because AQ is not as appealing to would-be Jihadists as Daesh is – especially with respect to launching terror attacks in the West – the group’s ideology has changed. It was AQ in Iraq that gave birth to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) – the precursor for Daesh. AQ’s ideology of violent Islamist extremism has not changed but has rather, as mentioned above, become more limited to achieving nationalistic ambitions. It is for this reason that would-be-jihadists across the world are more attracted to Daesh’s messaging and ideology – one that does not focus on single geography but rather by targeting countries, state institutions and individuals across the world. Daesh’s ability to attract younger recruits living abroad and converts to join its ranks or to commit lone-wolf terror attacks is likely due to those individuals’ lack of interest or knowledge concerning AQ’s affiliates’ operations and objectives in their respective geographies. For instance, a disenfranchised young Muslim individual living in a European country is more likely to come across Daesh propaganda online, become radicalised, and then carry out an attack in their home country in Daesh’s name, rather than coming across AQ propaganda, travelling to join an AQ affiliate and taking up arms against state and non-state actors in distant countries for causes they are not personally invested in.
The collapse of Afghan state institutions and the subsequent capture of the entire country by the Taliban in 2020 was and continues to be a boon for AQ. Despite the Taliban’s promises that it will not allow Afghanistan to be used as a springboard for terror attacks against the West, AQ’s central leadership can now shed its reliance on Iran as a safe haven and relocate its leadership to Afghanistan to recover and replenish its ranks and strength under the protection of the Taliban.
