There is no single approach to dealing with the rational choices of IS returnees
Author: Wasiq Wasiq, a journalist specialising in defence and terrorism
When Daesh in Iraq and Syria was at its peak in 2014, the then leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared it a caliphate ruled under shariah law. This was accompanied by a call for all Muslims to join in the endeavour of nation-state building based on their version of classical Islam. As a result of this call, approximately 5,000 European citizens travelled to Syria to join the group. This left western governments in a predicament they had not necessarily prepared for, that should these citizens seek to return, what should governments do?
This predicament can be abused by extremists who seek to exploit the good will of western governments, where the onus is on them to hold true to the principles, values and the laws upon which they’re built on, and extend this to those that have turned their backs on their country to join a terrorist group. Yet despite this moral and legal predicament, this situation cannot be ignored. There needs to be a workable solution to this.
Daesh can be considered a remnant of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) which was founded in 2004 by the Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al Zarqawi. During the period from 2007 to 2011, a significant increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq, coupled with opposition to AQI’s medieval practises meant that operationally, AQI was unable to operate with the freedom it had hoped for. However, it wasn’t until 2011 that the group began to recover, and hence begin its re-emergence. This is partly due to the fact that during these years, both Iraq and Syria were experiencing political, social and economic instability. For example, the United States Institute of Peace posits that when states are fragile, attacks against the U.S. and its allies are likely to increase, therefore, failure to address this leaves democratic nations vulnerable.
The emergence of Daeshas both as a political and religious force could not be ignored. Such was the case that they managed to recruit people from within the region, as well as those from outside. These individuals had left democratic states to join a makeshift theocratic state, where, in comparison to western nations, the laws appear to favour the ruler rather than the ruled. Yet despite this, individuals sought to travel there and join the terrorist organisation. But can the decision to join a terrorist group in a foreign region be seen as a rational choice, or, can it be argued that those that joined were manipulated?
Individuals seeking to join terrorist organisations and or carry out terrorist acts can broadly be placed into two categories: rational choice and irrational choice. When Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi invited people to join Daesh, individuals made the decision to accept that invitation. Eric Van Um in his research on the conceptualisation of rational thought posits that there are two strands within this theme. The first is ‘narrow’ where individuals make decisions that act as a utility for selfish reasons, whereas the second strand is ‘broad’ meaning that when an individual makes a choice, there is an underlying altruistic motivation to it. Furthermore, there is also the assumption that when an individual makes a choice, they do so as the best person to make that judgement. In other words, this decision making and judgement is not distributed to anyone else regardless of their position or authority. But there is also a crucial point here that when it is done at a group level, then the decisions and judgments are based on what is best for the group, despite what happens to individuals outside of the group.
The decision to join a group and then the decisions made within the group are for reasons that benefit the individual and the group. So, when people decide to join a terrorist group, it is reasonable to assume that that decision was for themselves primarily and then for the group secondarily. Of course, there are individuals that do not see it in this way, but rather see the action of joining a terrorist group such as Daesh as a duty for Allah (God). However, for government and policy makers, this is academic rather than practical. What is not necessarily important to them is why an individual join a terrorist group, but did joining the terrorist group fall into the choice of the rational paradigm?
Following the defeat of Daesh, many foreign nationals sought to come back to their homelands as there was no longer an incentive to stay in Syria. This meant that had their citizenship not been stripped, they were still eligible to return. But one individual had her citizenship stripped, despite being born and brought up in Britain.
Shamima Begum, the 15-year-old student of Bangladeshi origin alongside her two friends, Kadiza Sultana and Amira Abase, had travelled to Syria via Turkey to join the Daesh. It was reported that Sultana and Abase were killed in Syria, whereas Shamima Begum is still alive fighting a legal battle to reverse the revocation of her citizenship and return to Britain. It is reasonable to believe Begum had made a conscious rational decision to join the group, despite her age. In fact, age is a factor that should be taken into consideration when assessing someone’s decision making process, but it is certainly not a defining factor. To put this into context, the age of criminality is ten, and therefore children from this age can be held accountable for the decisions they make.
The then Home Secretary at the time, Sajid Javid, stripped Begum of her citizenship on the basis that it was conducive to the public good. As a matter of national security, he deemed her presence in Britain as a threat. But this isn’t the case with all Daesh returnees as there is evidence that others have returned and have been enrolled onto deradicalisation programs, have had their movements monitored or prosecuted if this was possible.
This is a sensible approach from the British government not to treat all Daesh returnees as the same. The risk they pose, the rational decisions they made to join the group and subsequently made to return to Britain should all be taken into consideration. That Shamima Begum was stripped of her citizenship demonstrates the utilitarian approach the British Government took in dealing with her, but not with others. This is a key point that appears to be missing in the commentary surrounding individuals seeking to return to Britain having joined a foreign terrorist organisation.
While it is entirely reasonable to debate the merits, the morality and legality of stripping someone of their citizenship for joining a terrorist organisation, it is equally entirely reasonable to accept this approach is not being used as a blanket one, but rather as a last resort. The stripping of citizenship is the most extreme decision a government can make in dealing with individuals that have joined a terrorist group, but then it is equally extreme for individuals to make the rational decision to join the group in the first place.
